

WASHINGTON.

"Liberty and Union, now and forever, one and inseparable."

SATURDAY, APRIL 17, 1847.

THE ADMINISTRATION AND THE ARMY.

While the whole country is filled with rejoicings at the brilliant successes which have distinguished the American arms, a studied attempt is made by the adherents of the Administration, in some instances boldly, and in others covertly, to snatch the merit of those successes from those to whom it properly belongs, and claim it all for the President and the Administration. To this end, three or four formidable columns made their appearance in "the Union" of Tuesday evening. The *Union*, indeed, evidently carries its purpose a little further than a mere demand for praise, and honor, and renown to the Administration. Its commendation of the President, made in the usual style of that paper—that is to say, made by mere repetition and accumulation of eulogistic words and phrases—is interspersed, here and there, with hints, not to be misunderstood, that Mr. Polk is again to be presented to the "Democracy" of the country as a candidate for the Presidency. Of this we care little; and the country, we presume, cares as little. But, for whatever end or object the attempt is now made to clothe the Administration, its head or its members, with honors truly and deservedly belonging to others, it is our purpose to expose that attempt to the utmost of our power, and to call down upon it the just indignation of honorable men. If we can prevent it, such birds shall not strut in borrowed plumes.

Before proceeding to the consideration of some particular occurrences, we have one or two general remarks to make, by way of preliminary explanation.

In the first place, then, it is known that a great majority, no doubt at least three-fourths, of the eminent and distinguished gentlemen in the Army are Whigs. Not, indeed, that they take any part in political contests, which their official station leads them, not improperly, to avoid; but that they are Whigs in sentiment, judgment, and feeling. They believe that, in general, Whig principles are the true principles of the Constitution, and Whig policy the true policy of the Country.

It is still more generally known, indeed it is known universally, that Gen. Scott, the Chief in command of the Army, and Gen. Taylor, who has distinguished himself so greatly, are both Whigs, Constitutional American Whigs, in all their opinions and sentiments.

In the next place, it is known that Gen. Scott has already been once strongly supported as a Whig candidate for the Presidency; and it is known, too, that after Gen. Taylor's brilliant achievements last year on the Rio Grande, a great many persons in the country, some of them of much consideration and influence, knowing the General to be a sterling Whig, were quite disposed to bring him forward for the highest place in the gift of the People.

And, in the third place, we have to say, that after all the various speculations upon the real motives which led the President and his Cabinet to plunge the country into this needless war, by far the most rational conclusion is, that they were instigated by a half-phrenzied purpose of gaining renown to themselves, by raising a military feeling in the country, and pushing it forward to combat and to victory.

But now comes the predicament. The army is, essentially, a Whig army. Its Generals are Whig Generals. If there was to be fighting, they were to do it; if there were to be victories, they were to win them. Was the Administration vain enough and weak enough to suppose that it would gather up for itself all the honors of successful military operations, and obscure the names of those eminent military men who must be the immediate agents and authors of successful military achievements? This was precisely the vanity and weakness, and the oblique and unjust purpose, which accompanied its motive for war. "War, necessary or unnecessary; war, for our honor and glorification; war, the misfortunes of which, if there shall be misfortunes, may be ascribed to others, and the glory of which, if there shall be glory, we can grasp eagerly for ourselves;" this short sentence, in our conscientious belief, sets forth truly the motives of the war, and the real objects and purposes for which it was brought on the country.

In short, President-making—to secure the succession to Mr. Polk, or to some other politician of the same stamp, by the acquisition of territory and of military glory, was the original, moving, burning stimulus, that led the Administration to plunge into war.

After these preliminary remarks, we now proceed to show, by clear and connected facts, that from the first conduct of the Administration has been marked by a ceaseless jealousy of the Whig Generals in command of the Army.

General Taylor has been the especial object of this jealousy from the day on which he drew his conquering sword in the battle of Palo Alto. This can easily be made apparent. In his Annual Message at the opening of the last session of Congress the President speaks in terms sufficiently high of the importance of the victories of Palo Alto, Resaca de la Palma, and Monterey, and in terms also sufficiently complimentary to the Army, in the aggregate, both regulars and volunteers, but he says nothing of ZACHARY TAYLOR. General Taylor, commander-in-chief though he was in all these well-fought fields, is *not* named.

Does any man believe that this would have been so if General Taylor had been a political partisan, a man ready to devote himself, body and soul, to the personal objects of the Administration? If such had been the character and the political relations of General Taylor, the praise bestowed upon him in the message would have been as indecently excessive as it was, in fact, indecently frugal. His name would have appeared, be assured, conspicuously enough, if his name had been one on which laurels could be hung, not for his own honor, but for the honor of his superiors. We rejoice—name we rejoice greatly, that ZACHARY TAYLOR's name was not such a name.

Here, then, was one open mark of disrespect to General Taylor, viz. the omission even to mention him in the Annual Message, when recounting the victories achieved by his gallantry and good conduct, and won, all of them, under his command.

But this studied and offensive slight was soon

followed by bolder demonstrations. Be it remembered that General Taylor had pushed forward his forces into Mexico, by order of the President; had every where acted with prudence and sagacity as well as bravery; had fought three several battles against odds, and been successful in all; and now stood high in the confidence of the Army, and waiting only for orders and proper reinforcements to advance further. At this juncture the President sent to Congress his famous message of January 4, 1847, recommending provision to be made for the appointment of a Lieutenant General. The object of this recommendation was not concealed. It was to supersede General Taylor, as well as every other officer in the Army, by appointing an officer of higher grade; and the person intended to fill this higher office, as all know, was a member of the Senate, of Mr. Polk's own party, and whose support of Mr. Polk's measure, in a party estimate of its importance, was absolutely essential. General Taylor was thus to be checked, in mid career; and henceforth he was to be under the direction of an officer of higher grade, just transferred from civil life; as was also his superior, Gen. Scott, when he should take the field.

"An efficient organization of the army," says the message, "composed of regulars and volunteers, whilst prosecuting the war in Mexico, it is believed would require the appointment of a General Officer, to take the command of all our military forces in the field." * * * "I recommend that provision be made by law for the appointment of such a General Officer, to serve during the war."

Translated out of official language, and expressed in plain terms, descriptive of well-known purposes and wishes, the foregoing recommendations stand exactly thus: "I do not think I can venture to recall General Taylor; but he is acquiring a very dangerous degree of distinction. I think it quite best to supersede him, by making Mr. Benton Lieutenant General, and thus placing him where he will naturally keep Zachary Taylor in the back ground."

Now, all this was as well understood and comprehended by the President's friends and followers, in Congress, as any other political party purpose whatever. The whole party (with a very few honorable exceptions) put their noses to the ground, sniffed the scent, and opened with as loud a cry as if the game was already near enough to be seized. Thus, one of the party orators in the House of Representatives, Mr. FICKLIN, of Illinois, on the 9th of January, denounced Gen. Taylor for not following up the battles of the Rio Bravo by cutting the Mexicans off; and, when answered that he had no bridges, the honorable Member exclaimed, "the General ought to have followed them into the river!" He further said, and this is the gist of the whole matter, "he might add, with the army in command of a Whig General, and with the opposition of Whig members on this floor, there was 'no doubt the war would be crippled.'" This is fine. Gen. TAYLOR had showed, according to this intelligent reader of the occurrences of the campaign, from Resaca de la Palma to Monterey, that he was a man under whose lead the war would be crippled! But Mr. Ficklin is as good as another to let out Executive secrets, and to express known Executive purposes; and from his declarations in Congress we learn two things—first, that Gen. TAYLOR was known to be a Whig; and, secondly, that it was deemed highly important to place the chief command of the army in the hands of one who was *not* a Whig.

On the same day, the game started by Mr. Ficklin was followed by Mr. THOMPSON, of Mississippi, another friend of the President, not undistinguished in the House. We give a few extracts from his speech:

"Mr. THOMPSON said he deeply regretted that, during the time we had been engaged in the contest, war had not been done. He confessed his own severe disappointment. He had expected that before this time we should have seen the power of Mexico effectually crippled." * * * "In the course of last summer 17,000 volunteers had been sent to the Rio Grande, and the whole of them but 3,000 had been kept on the banks of that pestilential stream. What did this evince? The want of a great, commanding, governing mind there. What we wanted was a man at the head of our armies who was capable of planning and conducting a campaign. We did not want in that station a mere fighting soldier. He admitted that Gen. Taylor was as valiant a fighting general as ever set foot in a field. He was as competent as any man could be in a subordinate position. He understood the drill and management of troops, and knew how to attack and to carry a fortified position. In all this sort of service he had eminently distinguished himself. But it required a different sort of mind to arrange and govern masses of men engaged in combined movements to prosecute a campaign. Many of the marshals of the French army had been brave and practical men, and could meet and conquer almost anything that could be brought to oppose them. But there had been but one Bonaparte. Mr. T. believed that none of these marshals were superior to Zachary Taylor in bravery or military accomplishments and skill; but that did not prove that he was capable of filling the place of a commander-in-chief, where strategy was the great thing needed. It did not follow that, because a subordinate officer had, by the death of those above him, risen to a station of high command, he was therefore competent to that station. He might, twenty years ago, have been a brave man and a good soldier, and regular promotion might have brought him to the head of the army. But it did not therefore follow that, when a war of invasion was to be conducted far into an enemy's country, at a vast distance from the seat of government, and when, from the necessity of the case, much must be left to the discretion of the commander, he was fit for the weight of such a command."

While Mr. THOMPSON was thus speaking in one end of the Capitol, the BONAPARTE, who had so filled his imagination, was quietly sitting in his place in the other end waiting for the upshot.

A similar mode of reasoning enabled the Mississippi member, having killed off Gen. TAYLOR, to make equally quick work with Gen. SCOTT:

"He admitted that Gen. Scott had been a great soldier in 1812; but it did not follow that he must, therefore, be a great soldier in 1846. He had fought well on our own frontier; but it did not follow that he was capable of conducting a campaign at the distance of three thousand miles from the seat of government."

And, this being accomplished, the two Whig Generals of the army having been thus proved unfit to conduct the campaign in Mexico, and many voices exclaiming, "Whom do you want?" he answered that "he had in his eye a very distinguished soldier who had been the subject of much and gross misrepresentation and abuse. He alluded to General BUTLER. He considered him fully equal to the task." Now, we entertain all respect for Gen. BUTLER; we hope he will soon recover of his wounds, and we thank him for the truths which he has recently told, in New Orleans and here; but he will not expect us to ascribe to him the merit of being a Whig; nor will we, on the other hand, impute to him the vanity of supposing himself, young and untried as he is as a General Officer, a fit person to take command out of the hands of WINFIELD SCOTT and ZACHARY TAYLOR.

Something still richer and of a higher relish than this came from another Democratic orator in the

House of Representatives, on the 26th of January, viz. Mr. WICK, of Indiana.

Mr. WICK said: "Then the Executive had submitted another plan to Congress, that of appointing a general officer to command the whole of our forces in the field. Mr. W. should not attempt to give the reasons which had been urged for and against this proposition. It was necessary to conduct a war the base of whose operations was the Rio Grande at the distance of 2,500 miles. The genius to imagine, to combine, to devise, to control, should be there. It was impossible the Executive could do it here: therefore it was necessary and proper that he should have a representative on the spot in the person of a lieutenant general. What Mr. W. said in this matter he said without advice from any head but his own; but he would say that there was another reason why that office should have been created. Who commanded our army in Mexico? Not Gen. Taylor, but Gen. Scott. And the question why should not these officers feel themselves responsible for the results of this war in Mexico? Not at all: it was not their war; they were not identified with it as a party, but opposed to it. Now, what was there to exempt a Whig General from the feelings of the Whig party? Mr. W. spoke now as a philosopher and a practical man, and he asked why should not these officers feel for their party? No doubt they would obey the orders given them: if by their measures were successful the glory was theirs; if they led to defeat they were not responsible—they would have mighty good reasons to give why they could not succeed. Now, ought this thing to be? Mr. W. would tell gentlemen, before the country, before the world—yes, and before God, (for he heard it all) that the Whigs were not responsible for the success of the war, and could not be made so, either for the general course and conduct of the war or for any single battle; and therefore he said that a Whig should not command the army. Let gentlemen make evil of it if they could. He said so not because he doubted the patriotism or the courage of Whig generals; far from it, but because the principles of human nature were at work in them just as they were in others. They would not devise or lead in devising a single measure to forward the success of the contest. They would execute the orders of a Democratic President, and execute them to the letter; nor would they do any thing that was unpatriotic on his face; but had they the feeling in their breast that all they desired or hoped for as public men was connected with the success of this contest? Not at all; they were Whigs; and this was judging them only by the same standard by which all other men were to be judged. The principles of human nature formed the rule of judgment. He believed they were no worse than other men and no better. Who would leave the army in command of men who disapproved of the war, or who would have no objection to get the Administration into trouble?"

These quotations prove to demonstration that the whole party understood it to be the President's object, and adopted it as their own, to take the command of the army out of Whig hands. If it were possible to confirm or fortify this truth, I could be done by referring to another and still more distinct act of the President himself. The President had failed in his repeated endeavors to prevail upon Congress to establish the office of Lieutenant General; but, with the object still in view of superseding Scott and Taylor, Mr. BENTON was appointed a Major General; and the question then arose whether, though a junior officer, the chief command could not be placed in his hands. This question, as we well know, was the subject of several Cabinet deliberations. The result was adverse to the President's wishes. It was found that such a proceeding would be against law, and void. The President's mortification at this discovery may be best expressed in his own words. In his letter to Mr. BENTON he says:

"Immediately after your nomination as Major General had been unanimously confirmed by the Senate, I carefully examined the question whether I possessed the power to designate you a junior Major General—to the chief command of the army in the field. The result of this examination is, I am constrained to say, a settled conviction on my mind that such power has not been conferred upon me by the existing laws."

"I am fully sensible of the exalted patriotism which could alone have induced you to make the personal sacrifices to which you would be subjected in assuming even the chief command of the army in Mexico; and I duly appreciate the reasons you have assigned, and which may, I fear, prevent you from accepting your appointment as Major General. If, on further reflection, such should be your decision, I shall learn it with deep regret."

Another remarkable ebullition of the spleen and jealousy of the party towards General Taylor is manifested in the proceedings of Congress respecting the Vote of Thanks. When a compliment is to be paid, a generous mind performs the duty cheerfully, promptly, and therefore gracefully. A lame and limping vote of thanks, if it be not insulting, is at least disrespectful. To "damn with faint praise" has become a proverbial phrase. Towards a rival or an opponent, especially, where commendation is due, and to be paid, a manly and elevated spirit measures out such commendation with a hand studiously liberal. Not so ignoble jealousy, low hatred, or miserable party fear and rancor. There are minds so constituted, or, for the time, under the influence of such ignoble passions, that, when it is absolutely necessary to praise a rival, every word uttered is as short and sharp as if the speaker were suffering under a violent fit of colic. Thanks, not only heartless but constrained, not only insincere, but abominated, pucker the mouth, like a green persimmon. This afflictive constriction of the organs of speech fell upon the Loco-foco orators in the House of Representatives, when it was proposed to give the thanks of Congress to Gen. TAYLOR. They lost all gibbness of tongue, all rotundity of period, all their usual graceful exuberance of tropes and figures. Their eloquence was cold, their conceptions barren, their style meager, mealy, and "dry as a remainder biscuit." The pen of the great master has drawn the whole picture—

"He hath waged
New wars 'gainst Pompey; made his will, and read
To public ear."
"Spoke scantly of me: when perforce he could not
But pay me terms of honor, cold and sickly
He vented them; most narrow measure lent me;
When the best hint was given him, he took it,
Or did it from his teeth."

A short historical narrative will best illustrate and confirm these remarks.

The President sent his Annual Message to Congress on the 8th of December. In this message proper justice was done the army, as we have already said, with the invidious and gross exception that there was a studied omission of doing honor to the Commander-in-chief, by mentioning him by name. But when was the army to be thanked by Congress? And who was to perform the agreeable duty of proposing the vote of thanks? Usually, there are enough not only willing, but eager, to perform that grateful task. It belongs, of propriety, to some leading man of the majority; some member connected with the appropriate branch of the business of the House. But *who*, of all the Administration members, sprang to his feet? *who* rushed to the tribune, in the name of Congress and the country, to tender an honorable testimonial to a skilful and successful General, and a gallant and patriotic army? Those who were loud for the war, where were they? The lovers of acquisition, and glory, and conquest, they who spoke of visiting the Halls of the Montezumas, where were they all when a distinguished victory by a Whig General was announced?

A "Whig General!" Aye, that brings on the fit again. "Thou stickest a dagger in me, Tubal!" "A Whig General—a man already dangerous and formidable to our party—must we thank him? Let us thank Mr. Polk—let us thank the Secretary of War—let us thank ourselves—let us thank any body else; but let us be in no haste to thank Gen. TAYLOR."

Congress remained speechless on the subject of a vote of thanks until the 29th of January, when Mr. COCKE, a very respectable Whig member from Tennessee, moved for leave to introduce the appropriate resolutions. The leave was resisted, for a time, by the usual resorts to side-blows and evasions; but, finally, after an adjournment for the day, the leave was given, and the resolutions were introduced and read. Thereupon Mr. FARAN, a Democratic member from Ohio, immediately moved to attach to the resolution, by way of amendment, a declaration that "the war was commenced and forced on us by Mexico, and was continued by us in defence of the honor and vindication of the just rights of the United States, assailed, as both had been, by repeated and flagrant acts on the part of Mexico, of insults, outrages, and finally of invasion of one of the States of this Union." Any man of a proper self-respect would have blushed, one would think, in proposing to suffix such a declaration as this to a vote of thanks. But there is reason to think, nevertheless, that it was done upon concert. The object was so to alter the proposed vote of thanks as that Whig members could not support it. But Mr. THOMPSON (of Mississippi) wished to go further. Mr. Faran's proposition would do, as a trap for the Whigs, but there was no sting in it for General TAYLOR. So Mr. THOMPSON proposed an additional declaration, viz. "that nothing herein contained shall be construed into an approbation of the terms of the capitulation of Monterey." This, it was thought, would hit the Whig General full in the face. Whether this, too, was part of the result of a party consultation, or whether it only was that Mr. FARAN and Mr. JACOB THOMPSON had agreed to hunt in couples, the former gentleman immediately accepted the proposition of the latter as an amendment to his own; and, incredible as it may seem, Mr. COCKE's very appropriate and just resolutions, botched and disfigured by these additions, actually passed the House of Representatives of the United States! We could not but regard this proceeding as one of the most unworthy and discreditable that ever disgraced the Journal of a Legislative body, and took occasion at the time so to represent it. Mr. FARAN's amendment was known by him, and by every body, to contain statements of facts wholly foreign to the subject, and which at least one third of the House believed to be directly and flatly false. This was a repetition of the unworthy trick played off by the same party in the act of May last recognising the existence of war.

As to Mr. Thompson's amendment we hardly know how to characterize it. It was quite competent to Mr. Thompson to withhold his support from the vote of thanks, if he did not think thanks deserved; but when a proposition was before the House to pay a tribute of respect to a soldier, to a man with whom honor is every thing, and who feels a reproach as a wound, to insert in such a proceeding a *fling*, a contumely, in the form of a *doubt*, or a proviso, is a proceeding which we cannot conceive how Mr. THOMPSON could propose, or a House of Representatives adopt. But all this was to derogate from the Whig General, who had already been pronounced unfit to be entrusted with the command of the army. It was to stigmatize Gen. TAYLOR, to break him down, and crush at once his rising and dangerous popularity. Thanks to the justice of an overruling Providence, all these miserable inventions have returned, with tenfold bitterness and a thousand new stings, "to plague the inventors."

How poor, how cheap, do the actors in these scenes now look! How much must they be ashamed of what they have said and done! What would they not give to obliterate the record of their speeches and their votes!

General TAYLOR's military feats have been quite distinguished. With as much propriety as those of almost any other man they may be called "prodigies." But General TAYLOR, it is clear, was not born to be himself the victim of a "prodigy." An eagle, "towering in his pride of flight," was not doomed to be "by mousing owls hawked at and killed."

Let us now follow these "Resolutions of Thanks" into the Senate.

They were taken up in that body on the 3d of February. Mr. SPEIGHT moved to strike out the proviso moved in the House by Mr. THOMPSON: saying, with great propriety, that "he was not willing to present thanks with one hand and a censure with the other." Mr. SEVIER and Mr. BAGBY advocated the proviso, as they disapproved the terms of the capitulation of Monterey. Mr. ARCHER put a very significant inquiry: "He desired to know why the Senator (Mr. SEVIER) was for connecting the subject of the capitulation with the resolution of thanks?" Mr. CRITTENDEN spoke at length against the proviso, as did Mr. JOHN M. CLAYTON. Mr. CRITTENDEN shrewdly suggested that "Senators were endeavoring to qualify the matter so as to go against General TAYLOR, or in his favor, according as the tide of war or the tide of politics might turn." Now, this was the exact truth, not only in regard to certain members of Congress, but in regard to the Administration itself. The Administration meant to leave Gen. TAYLOR in such a position that, if successful, they could claim the merit to themselves, and, if unfortunate, might throw the blame on him. But to proceed with the vote of thanks:

Mr. WEBSTER said that he regretted exceedingly that when they were about to tender a tribute of respect to a military man abroad, any thing should occur, or any thing be proposed to be connected with it, which would break the entire unanimity of Congress. To be valuable, the tribute of respect must be unanimously bestowed. It must appear to flow from a general sense of what was due to the occasion and to the officer; and always, as far as he knew, or as he remembered the history of the Government, he believed the thanks of Congress, when tendered at all to a military man, were tendered by a distinct proposition, free and clear from all other considerations whatever. Propriety and the gratefulness belonging to the occasion required that they should be tendered. He held in his hand a resolution which passed this body last year. It was in these words:

"That the thanks of Congress are due and are hereby tendered to Major General ZACHARY TAYLOR, his officers and men, for the fortitude, skill, enterprise, and courage which distinguished the late brilliant military operations upon the Rio Grande."

He proposed to frame a resolution in these very words, and to adopt it, so as to make it a real substantial tribute of respect

to General Taylor and the army under his command. And he had only further to say, that he could vote for no resolution, in the present state of things, which contained any sting towards Gen. Taylor, or any censure upon his conduct in any respect, or which implied any doubt or hesitation.

After a series of further very appropriate and just remarks by Mr. WEBSTER, followed by Mr. CRITTENDEN—

The yeas and nays were then taken on Mr. SPEIGHT's motion to strike out the proviso, and it was decided in the affirmative, as follows: Yeas 33, nays 15.

Mr. WEBSTER then moved his substitute for the resolution, and the yeas and nays being taken thereon, are as follows: YEAS—Messrs. Archer, Badger, Berrien, Butler, Calhoun, Cilley, John M. Clayton, Thomas Clayton, Corwin, Crittenden, Davis, Dayton, Evans, Greene, Huntington, Jarnagin, Johnson, of Maryland, Johnson, of Louisiana, Mangum, Miller, Morehead, Pearce, Simmons, Upham, Webster, and Woodbridge—26.

NAYS—Messrs. Allen, Ashley, Atchison, Atherton, Bagby, Benton, Breese, Bright, Cass, Chalmers, Dix, Fairfield, Hays, Houston, Niles, Rusk, Sevier, Soule, Speight, Sturgeon, Turney, Westcott, and Yulee—23.

The resolution, as amended, was then reported to the Senate, and read a third time.

By unanimous consent, it was then read a third time; and the question being on its passage, the yeas and nays were taken, and are as follows: Yeas 43, nays, none.

By the foregoing it will be seen that a clear, honorable, and distinct vote of thanks was carried in the Senate, on the motion of Mr. WEBSTER, supported by all the Whigs of the Senate and the two Senators from South Carolina, as a substitute for that melody of thanks and censure which had come up from the House. The sense of a majority of the Senate being thus definitely settled, the resolution passed unanimously; and finally, after some cavil and dispute about forms, was agreed to by the House. So much for the vote of thanks.

We could easily fill our paper with extracts from speeches of Democratic members, inculcating and censuring General TAYLOR; but we have transcribed enough to show the spirit of the party in Congress in regard to that distinguished officer, who, if he has not by this time fought his way into favor with that party, has turned their reproaches into hollow praise.

We have done for the present with this subject and only for the present; for it is our purpose as far as in our power to take care that no fraud be practised on the Public in this respect. It is our purpose to be just. The Administration has its peculiar merits, which we in common with the whole country readily accord to it. It has the merit of bringing on this war. It has the merit of bringing General SANTA ANNA back into Mexico to head and lead the Mexican forces against the armies of the United States. It has the merit, with the aid of its friends in Congress, of a zealous and repeated though happily abortive attempt to supersede the two Whig Generals, SCOTT and TAYLOR. All these merits belong to it, and with these it must satisfy its appetite for praise.

We had proposed, when we began this article, to pay our respects to the organ of the Administration, that type and model of consistency, "the Washington Union." But we have already occupied so much space, that we have not room to do justice to the subject. We must defer that purpose to a more convenient season.

THE "ORDER IN COUNCIL."

While one sees, with deep mortification, the hot haste with which mere party men, following the lead of the Government, rush to the support of every Executive usurpation; and while one sees also, with regret and pain, that some other men, not devoted to the Administration, in their natural exultation at the success of our arms, do not pause to consider whether the usurpations of the country and the public liberty have not fallen into reckless hands, it is yet consoling to find that there are men of all parties wise and patriotic enough to prefer the Constitution of their country to the triumphs of Party, or the triumphs of War. It is with feelings gratified by an instance of this honorable independence and devoted public spirit, that we lay the following letter before our readers. It is written by a gentleman of character, of much experience in public affairs, and not likely to be particularly prejudiced against the Administration, having been an early and important friend of Gen. JACKSON, and filled high stations under him and under his successor, Mr. VAN BUREN. The reasoning of this letter is close and to the point. His reference to constitutional provisions are correct, pertinent, and, as we think, most conclusive.

Sentiments so just, so well stated, and so important, ought to command the attention of every man who prefers the safety of the Constitution to Military triumph and Party ascendancy.

"DEAR SIR: If it will not encroach too much upon your time you will do me a great favor by giving me your opinion as to the power of the President to establish a revenue system in the ports of Mexico captured by the armies of the United States."

"My opinion, certainly not worth much, is, that he has no such power. The constitution provides that the Congress shall have power—'1st. To raise and support armies; but no appropriation of money to that use shall be for a longer term than two years.'

"2. To make all laws necessary for carrying into execution all other powers vested by this constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any department or officer thereof."

"3. To declare war, &c., and make rules concerning captures on land and water."

"Under the last clause is not the power assumed by the President to make rules concerning captured ports, &c. (on land) given to Congress by the constitution expressly, and, therefore, NOT IN THE PRESIDENT?"

"Second. The President assumes that, in order to carry out his powers as commander-in-chief, he has the right to make edicts, decrees, or laws which shall govern the people of all the world having commercial intercourse with Mexico. Now, under the constitution, it might be said that Congress had the power to make such edicts, decrees, or laws, if they became necessary and proper to carry out the powers of the President as an officer of the Government of the United States."

"Third. Congress is to raise and support armies, but for no longer, by an appropriation, than two years. Now, the President assumes the power, by a system, to continue as long as he pleases to support armies. He alone having the power to negotiate, he may continue this system during the residue of his term of office, even if Mexico should sue for peace, and offer just terms."

"It seems to be a power contrary to the letter, and certainly to the whole spirit, of this clause of the constitution."

"The 'Federalist,' No. 69, says: '2d. The President is to be commander-in-chief of the army and navy of the United States. In this respect his authority would be nominally the same with that of the King of Great Britain, but in substance much inferior to it. It would amount to nothing more than the supreme command and direction of the military and naval forces as first general and admiral of the Confederacy, while that of the British King extends to the declaring of war and to the raising and regulating of fleets and armies: all which, by the constitution under consideration, would appertain to the Legislature.'"

A good story is told, it is said, by Mr. Secretary Marcy about the shipment to Vera Cruz of the mortars and shells for General Scott. There were forty of the mortars to be sent. Ten were sent by the Tamaroo, and the remainder by other vessels. The ten by the Tamaroo arrived and were used—the others did not arrive. The Secretary says the reason is that the Tamaroo was paid by the job, and therefore made the best of her way; but the other vessels were paid by the day, and took a plenty of sea room.—*Baltimore Patriot*.

THE EIGHTEEN MILLION LOAN.

Saturday last was the day to which was limited the reception of Proposals, according to public advertisement by the Secretary of the Treasury, for a Loan of Eighteen Millions of Dollars, under the authority of the act of Congress of 28th January last. The loan is founded on Treasury Notes to be issued under said act, payable two years after the date of said notes, with interest, at the rate of six per cent. per annum; which Treasury Notes are receivable in all payments of duties to the Government, and may be funded, at the option of the holder, at any time within the two years.

The general result of the bids we understand to be, that offers were received for the Loan to the aggregate amount of Fifty-eight Millions of Dollars—three times the amount required—all of which were, more or less, and some of them as high as two per centum, above par.

This extraordinary offering proves beyond question the existence of an abundance of unemployed capital in our country—much of which is the earning of merchants by the late unprecedentedly high freights paid by the Government itself and by the exporters of grain to Europe—and proves also, it must be admitted, a certain confidence of capitalists in the credit of the Government, greatly assisted, we believe, by a vague expectation which generally prevails of an early peace with Mexico. This hope prove not to be unfounded, and may it most speedily be realized!

The good fortune of the Administration, in drawing "aid and comfort," as it thus does, from the consequences of the failure of the food crops in different countries of Europe, has hardly ever been equalled. No longer ago than at the opening of the late session of Congress, we ourselves, upon the authority of the best informed men in our country, expressed great doubts of the ability of the Government to obtain further loans on almost any terms. Upon the same or like authority, precisely the same ground was taken by the Executive and Financial Departments of the Government. To prove this we need not refer our readers to the earnest and almost beseeching appeals of the President in successive Messages to Congress to lay additional taxes to enable the Government to make additional loans. For our present purpose it is sufficient to quote the language of the *Secretary of the Treasury* to the very same effect as ours. Our prediction on the subject bore date on the 17th December last; the Secretary's on the 21st of the same month, being contained in an Official Letter to the Committee of Ways and Means, calling their attention to the views submitted in his last annual report in regard to imposing duties on tea and coffee. "These duties," said he, "were suggested in view of the necessity of obtaining the loan therein proposed, and this Department feels bound to communicate the opinion entertained by it that, in the absence of these duties, it will probably be wholly impracticable to negotiate the loan on such terms as would be permitted by Congress."

"The duties were not laid, and yet the loan has been negotiated with unexampled facility! We would here repeat, (had it not lately more than once been quoted in our columns), as applicable to both our anticipations on this head, the poet's adage—

"The wisest schemes of mice and men may fail."

Considering the amount of capital seeking investment, as disclosed by this show of hands, and the certainty of the Government being able to command further loans for all its probable uses—especially if peace be really at hand—there is good ground for believing that the successful bidders for this loan will have made a profitable business of it: for it is reasonable to suppose that a Government stock, for which there was so much competition that two-thirds of the bidders are disappointed of their object, will command a premium in the market.

The Warrenton (N. C.) Reporter contains a call for a meeting of the citizens of Granville, Warren, and Franklin counties in that State, without distinction of party, on the 17th of April, to appoint a committee of arrangements to receive the PRESIDENT of the UNITED STATES and his suite, to offer him their hospitalities, and to conduct him on his way to the University of North Carolina, at Chapel Hill, where the "Commencement" takes place the first Thursday in June next. Mr. MASON, the Secretary of the Navy, and a graduate of the same institution, is to deliver an address on the occasion.

GEN. TAYLOR.

The latest news from the Rio Grande states that Gen. TAYLOR has returned to Saltillo after in vain pursuing Gen. URREA. He could not reach him, though he was once close upon him near Marín. Gen. Taylor's force consisted of about 1,000 men, of whom only 150 were cavalry.

The impression at the mouth of the Rio Grande was that Gen. Taylor would push on to San Luis. This is inferred from his ordering so much transportation to be sent forward.

THE ALVARADO EXPEDITION.

The expedition against Alvarado left Vera Cruz on the 31st March, the land forces consisting of Gen. Quitman's brigade, with a battery of light artillery; the naval force consisting of the steam frigate Mississippi, the Potomac, sloop-of-war St. Mary's, steamers Vixen, Spitfire, and Water-witch, the brig Porpoise, one bomb-ketch, and five gunboats.

Another expedition, under Gen. Twigg, started on the same morning for the National Bridge, a strongly fortified place, about two days' march from Vera Cruz, on the Jalapa road.

ARRIVAL FROM VERA CRUZ.